Our third measure of intra-group credit performance is the percentage of members who ever accessed credit from the group. This measure captures the outreach of the intra-group credit activity. We can hardly claim a group to perform well with respect to intra-group credit activity if. This suggests that on average intra-group credit is quite accessible to group members. As to outside credit we use two measures. The first is the ratio of outside credit to the actual group savings.
This provides an indication of the access to outside credit and of its order of magnitude. On average outside credit was equal to 1.
For the subsample of sixteen groups which so far had obtained an outside credit the ratio was on average equal to six. In contrast to the intra-group loans, the repayment schedule for outside credit is stipulated in advance. For the subsample of the 16 groups which had obtained outside credit, we therefore also use a second indicator of outside credit performance, i. On average sixty one percent of the outside credit had been repaid on time by these groups.
As a performance measure for income generating activities we use the number of income generating activities undertaken by a group.
Table 1 shows that on average a SHG undertook as few as 0. This small number is due to the large number of SHGs who are not involved in such activities. Only 20 of the 63 SHGs in our sample undertook one or more income generating activities. In the same way we measure the groups performance with respect to social activities by the number of social activities undertaken. This number is obtained as the sum of positive answers on the following questions: Is the group undertaking community development activities, discussing traditional customs or practices like the age of marriage or giving dowry, discussing the availability and use of social services e.
On average, almost two social issues were either discussed or action was taken to remedy them. Only four groups did not undertake any of the above mentioned activities. Finally, although the performance of groups on each of these distinct features may provide us with useful insights, an index of global performance may be interesting. We opted for the use of a technique of unequal weighting, i.
This technique involves the application of weights which are specific for each observation, in our case each SHG, in such a way that the outcome is most. It boils down to the solution of a linear programming problem with constraints on weights. The lack of adequate information about the true objectives of each group induces this benefit of the doubt weighting.
In this way, the different objectives pursued by a SHG can be incorporated into the performance indicator. As shown by table 1 the performance indictor SHGPI 3 encompasses performance indicators of four distinct categories, while SHGPI 5 incorporates two measures of intra-group lending and excludes outside credit Next, we turn to the potential determinants of performance. They are shown in table 2. These variables will be used as explanatory variables in the regressions discussed in section 6.
The first potential determinant is the degree of self-selection within a group. We measure this by the sum 1 for each positive answer of whether the group reports it self selected, whether the group explicitly reports people have been refused to join, whether members dropped out except in case of death or permanent migration and whether new members joined later The second determinant we consider is social homogeneity.
In a segmented society like the Indian one, it is indeed conceivable that persons with a homogeneous background have better information on each other. To measure social homogeneity we consider six characteristics, i. On average, the group members have in between two and three of those characteristics in common.
See also Wydick Next we consider peer monitoring. As a proxy for this variable we use the frequency of group meetings.
This frequency promotes an SHGs monitoring ability and activity. Most groups meet once or twice a month. The fourth potential determinant of group performance is group solidarity or intra-group insurance.
We measure this variable by a dummy equal to one if the group members state that they help one another in times of need in other ways than through giving the needy member an intra-group loan.
Many groups report paying jointly a members periodical saving contribution or providing some rice or other food item in case a member is affeced by an emergency. In almost half of the groups interviewed we observed the existence of some kind of intra-group insurance. Fifth we consider group pressure. This is measured by a dummy equal to one if the group states that they are willing to exert pressure on a member who is not living up to her obligations.
The dynamic incentive of promised access to progressively larger outside credit is our sixth potential determinant of performance. As explained in section 4 the SGSY-schemes distinctive feature is the promise made at the groups start of provision of outside credit upon excellent savings and intra-group credit performance.
Upon approval of its first loan application an SHG under the scheme can obtain a first bank loan of up to 25 Rs.
If this is repaid on schedule a second loan can be obtained for up to Rs. Later loans can consist of even higher amounts. The inclusion of several microfinance schemes within our data set gives us the possibility, not available in other empirical studies, to estimate the efficacy of a particular program feature like this dynamic incentive of promised access to increasingly larger outside credit.
On the other hand, we should keep in mind that groups belonging to the SGSY-scheme may also share other distinguishing features, e. Of the 63 groups interviewed 30 belong to the SGSY-scheme. Finally two control variables are added to the analysis. These are remoteness from basic infrastructure services and the number of SHGs in the village. The first control variable is measured by the mean distance in kilometres of the SHGs meeting place from ten basic infrastructure services, i.
For our sample SHGs the average mean distance is 3. On average three SHGs operate in a sample village. We now discuss the expected sign of the effect the potential determinants may have on the performance indicators. On the basis of the theoretical literature we expect self-selection, group solidarity and the dynamic incentive of promised increasing outside credit to have an unambiguous positive effect on the performance indicators.
Although some authors argue that social ties have a positive impact on group performance, others point to enforcement and collusion problems in the presence of social ties between members, resulting in poorer group performance. Therefore the sign of the effect of social ties on group performance is not a priori clear.
Peer pressure is expected to have a positive effect on enforcement of obligations, but it could negatively affect group cohesion and investment choice. Therefore again the sign of its effect on group performance is not a priori clear. The same remark apply to peer monitoring. The expectations regarding the sign of the effects of potential determinants apply directly to the performance on group savings, intra-group credit and outside credit.
But we will also test for the existence and sign of their effects on the groups income generating and social activities.
Remoteness from basic infrastructure services is expected to work against group performance. Scarce resources are diverted to cover the inherently higher transportation costs and fewer investment and market opportunities are available. Besides in remote villages people usually lack access to services like banks and primary health care. Nevertheless, because of the absence of alternative financial services and the limited mobility of people living in remote areas, these are thought to be the optimal environment to use dynamic incentives in micro finance programs see among others Morduch, The coefficient of the interaction term of the SGSY-dummy, representing the dynamic incentive of a promised stream of increasingly larger loans, and the basic infrastructure index shows the effect of this dynamic incentive in remote villages.
We do not report the results here as the inclusion of this interaction term brings along a multicollinearity problem. This is not surprising given our limited number of observations. At first sight, however, the results seem to support the hypothesis of a more positive impact of a promised sequence of progressively larger formal loans in interior villages. The estimates are tentative of significant, positive correlation of the SGSY-basic infrastructure index interaction term with intra-group loan repayment, outside credit performance, the number of income generating activities undertaken, the number of social activities undertaken and most general performance indicators.
In the case of intra-group loan. Many authors postulate a negative impact of increased competition in micro finance on a groups performance.
If drop-outs can easily get credit or other micro financial services under another scheme, incentives weaken and the sustainability of the groups is at stake.
We check for this by examining the effect of the number of SHGs, regardless of the scheme they belong to, within the same village.
We test for the existence of a link between each of the eight individual performance indicators and the potential determinants we described in the previous section, and for the sign of the link Before turning to the regression results, we note that it is not possible to extend our results beyond the groups observed.
Indeed selection into the Self Help Group scheme is probably non-random, but based on characteristics such as below poverty line status, gender and limited landholdings. Therefore selection bias in the estimators constitutes a problem which we are unable to accommodate.
Another potential source of sample selection bias, namely the fact that groups choose on the basis of certain characteristics or factors whether or not to undertake all or some of the five activities mentioned in section 5. The regression results are given in table In this table we mention only the sign of the links absence of sign implies a positive link and its statistical significance. Consider e. The negative sign means that there exists the existence of social ties is associated with a lower percentage of members who have had access to intra-group loans.
A single and double star mean that the repayment for instance, the negative effect of the promise of outside credit on the percentage loans too long outstanding is larger in remote areas. Besides the coefficient on the basic infrastructure index remains highly statistically significant and positive, suggesting that groups living in remote areas have a higher loan fraction in arrears. Full details on estimation techniques, biases and impact of potential determinants can be found in Verhelle Except for one of the regressions capturing the groups outside credit performance, all models seem to have some explanatory power.
The Wald test statistic of these models exceeds the critical value of Therefore we can reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients except the constant term are equal to zero.
As the table shows the results we obtain for the different performance measures are quite diverse. We first consider the six financial performance indicators as well as the two synthetic indicators.
The latter is contrary to what was a priori expected. Group solidarity or intra-group insurance seems crucial in driving the results. It has. But it is associated with higher access of members to intragroup credit and of the group to outside credit. It is also associated with higher values of the synthetic group performance indicators. The dynamic incentive of promised access to increasingly larger outside credit also is.
It is associated with a better repayment performance for intra-group credit and with higher outside credit obtained. But it is negatively linked with the outside repayment of outside credit.
We see no easy explanation for this negative link. But we have no evidence to support this hypothesis. Observe also that there is no statistical evidence of a link of this variable with the overall performance indicator.
Social ties are found to have detrimental effects on the groups performance. Compared to the other group characteristics, peer monitoring, proxied by the. Monitoring affects savings positively, but peer pressure has a negative bearing on the probability of intra-group loans in arrears.
Both control variables, i. The regression results indicate that SHGs remote from basic infrastructure perform worse than other SHGs except for their outside credit repayment performance. These findings are in line with the theoretical presumptions of the difficult working environment of groups in remote areas hampering in general their performance, but enhancing their performance with respect to outside credit repayment due to the threat of being cut off from future outside credit upon default.
Finally, the presence of other SHGs in a village has predominantly positive effects, except for performance on intra-group credit repayment. We now turn to the two remaining performance indicators, income generating activities and social activities. The former are positively associated with self-selection and by frequency of meetings and negatively with intra-group insurance and the promise of progressively increasing outside credit.
Again, we have no easy explanation for this negative link. Social activities are negatively associated with social ties and positively with intra-group insurance. Overall, social ties, intra-group insurance and the dynamic incentive of a promised progressively larger stream of outside credit play a crucial role in determining the groups performance. But some of the negative associations are difficult to explain.
The results presented in section 6. More specifically, the frequency of meetings, the variables for group solidarity and peer pressure, and the SGSYdummy may be affected by the same random factors as those affecting the SHGs performance.
This may result in biased estimates We statistically correct for this problem by using instrumental variables IV estimation. This means that we replace the actual value of those explanatory variables by the their estimated value.
The latter is obtained by using regression equations in which those explanatory variables are regressed on a number of new variables, called instrumental variables Table 4 gives the revised empirical results when IV-estimation is used to correct for possible endogeneity For a more thorough explanation of the endogeneity issue, we refer to section IV.
See Verhelle for full details. The instruments diyextf and hocavil both take on the value 0 in the 16 and 11 observations respectively. With respect to our previous results few conclusions remain Self-selection and peer monitoring play only a limited role, with monitoring. The dynamic incentive of promised, increasingly larger outside credit and. The promise of outside credit is still the only group characteristic beneficial to the intra-group credit repayment.
The number of SHGs in a village appears to have a strong effect on group. Hence, the conclusions concerning the crucial role played by the dynamic incentive of promised outside credit and the control variables, remoteness and other SHGs in the village, are unchanged.
The major differences with the previous analysis can be summarized as follows: 1. After instrumentation, self-selection only exerts a small positive effect. It is Peer pressure also.
Social ties are less important in determining a groups performance and have. Although group solidarity may affect group performance in a positive way, it. The existence of other SHGs in the village appears to inflict predominantly. Hence, peer pressure emerges as an important factor underlying successful group performance, while the decisive role of social ties and group solidarity in determining group performance has vanished. The regression results suggest that there is matching endogeneity , in the sense of groups with a particular group characteristic being also more likely to possess another group characteristic.
Controlling for this endogeneity rather seriously affects the conclusions, urging for caution in the interpretation of the empirical analyses found in the literature so far. Under the imperfect information paradigm, formal lenders discriminate against small borrowers because of the high cost of information acquisition and their weak enforcement capacity.
This has led to the search for alternative financial service delivery systems for poor borrowers all over the developing world. The most popular alternative has been microfinance. In recent years, an overwhelming number of theoretical models arose to explain the extraordinary repayment performance of microcredit groups. The vast majority.
Joint-liability was heralded as the driving force behind self-selection. Recently, some economic theorists point to the importance of other. Among these, emphasis was laid on the use of a stream of progressively bigger loans combined with denial of new credit in case of default. So far empirical analysis to quantify the roles of these overlapping and competing mechanisms is scant. We therefore believe the contribution of this paper to be threefold. First, given the huge amount of resources being pledged to support for.
This paper contributes to this empirical literature by providing evidence on determinants of microfinance group performance in India. Second, unlike previous empirical studies we are able to apportion the effect of promised increasingly larger outside credit cum credit denial. Due to data problems the impact of this. Third, none of the empirical studies hitherto specifically accommodates the endogeneity problem, which could render the estimates inconsistent.
This paper takes a useful first step in that direction. We find strong and robust evidence that the promise of progressively larger outside credit has a positive impact on group performance. As this mechanism is not. This evidence is further strengthened by the finding of a more powerful effect of the nonrefinancing threat in remote villages. Communities characterized by low competition in financial services and low mobility may indeed be thought to be sensitive to a scheme of progressive lending cum credit denial upon default.
In addition, as expected, groups located at some distance from a main road seem to perform worse in their other undertakings. Although we initially found evidence of predominantly positive. Furthermore, when endogeneity is taken into account, a highly significant positive effect of peer pressure on the groups performance is evident. Peer pressure first only seemed to play a secondary and supporting role compared to intra-group insurance, but correcting for endogeneous matching shows its importance as a driving force behind the groups performance.
Checking for endogeneity, social ties do not seem to play a crucial role in determining group performance. Group solidarity, which at first seemed to be the crucial. Hence, accomodating the endogeneity problem seems to alter the results quite substantially.
Thus one should be careful with the interpretation of the uninstrumented estimation results. In sharp contrast to the enormous amount of theoretical models attributing the success of microfinance to self-selection and peer monitoring, these mechanisms hardly seem effective in our data set.
In brief, our results are suggestive of the importance of promising progressively larger outside credit and threatening with credit denial upon default as a driving force behind group performance of the 63 Chhattisgarhi groups surveyed. Peer pressure within these groups affects group performance positively as well, while the existence of other Self Help Groups in the same village seems to bear a negative impact on the groups performance. Ackerberg, D. Armendriz de Aghion, B.
Banerjee, A. Besley, T. Bond, P. Conning, J. Devereux, S. Ghatak, M. Hulme, D. Laffont, J. Mahmud, S.
Melyn, W. Morduch, J. Rai, A. Sadoulet, L. Sharma, M. Stiglitz, J. Van Tassel, E. Varian, H. Verhelle, C. Wenner, M. Woolcock, M.
Wydick, B. Zeller, M. Standard errors are in parentheses. The monitoring freqmeet , group solidarity ingrins , peer pressure peerpr and dynamic incentive sgsy variables are instrumented.
Table A1: Summary statistics of all variables used in the regression analyses Table A2: Regression analysis of potential determinants on groups savings and intra-group credit performance Table A3: Regression analysis of potential determinants on groups outside credit, income generating and social activities performance Table A4: Regression analysis of potential determinants on constructed Self Help Group Performance Indices Table A5: IV regression analysis of potential determinants on groups savings and intragroup credit performance Table A6: IV regression analysis of potential determinants on groups outside credit, IGA and social activities performance Table A7: IV regression analysis of potential determinants on the constructed SHG Performance Indices.
Explanatory variables: Self-selection selfselm Social ties homog Peer monitoring freqmeet Group solidarity ingrins Group pressure peerpr Dynamic incentives sgsy Control variables infrstkm vilnrshg. The insignificant coefficients of the intercept term of the other cut off points in the ordered logit regression are not reported for the sake of brevity. Outsdttl 2 stage: IV.
Intlodel IV -. Membcre IV -. Open navigation menu. Close suggestions Search Search. User Settings. Skip carousel. Carousel Previous. Carousel Next. What is Scribd? Explore Ebooks. Bestsellers Editors' Picks All Ebooks.
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Description: theories. Flag for inappropriate content. Download now. Save Save Theories For Later. Related titles. Carousel Previous Carousel Next. Microfinance and Entrepreneurship Development in Idia 1. Jump to Page. Search inside document. Theory The success of microfinance in terms of credit repayment triggered the interest of many economists in the mechanisms generating these high repayment rates. Through joint- liability lending microfinance institutions can lessen the three major problems facing formal credit institutions in lending to the poor.
By utilizing the informational advantages of members belonging to the same community and their potential to exert pressure on borrowers, borrowing groups under a joint-liability contract are in a better position than formal banking institutions to address these problems Ghatak and Guinnane, A vast literature investigates this peer selection effect of joint liability see among others Varian , Ghatak and Guinnane , Ghatak , Laffont and NGuessan and Armendriz de Aghion and Gollier Joint liability agreements can thus potentially induce peer monitoring, reduce the incidence of strategic default and enhance the lenders ability to elicit debt repayments Armendriz de Aghion, The enforcement problem arises from the lenders limited ability to apply sanctions against a delinquent borrower.
Microfinance institutions are widely perceived to face the twin disadvantages of operating in environments where diversion is easy and collateral is scarce.
Hence, if social penalties are sufficiently severe, group lending will necessarily yield higher repayment rates than individual lending. Besides, under joint-liability lending, successful group members may have an incentive to repay the loans of group members whose projects have yielded insufficient returns Besley and Coate, Besides, the lending institutions are partly lending against the households other income sources, not just the income stream of the risky project as this does not materialize instantly.
Empirical analysis As mentioned by among others Wydick and Paxton, Graham and Thraen , empirical testing lags behind the extensive theoretical literature. Of the two measures of Hulme and Mosley term this progressive lending. As collusion may be more likely and enforcement more difficult in the presence of previously existing social ties see among others Wydick, and Laffont and NGuessan, , this result is hardly surprising.
As the latter characteristics are more likely to prevail in Nevertheless, if a group member strategically defaults on the loan, the group members are observed to enforce repayment by liquidating assets of the defaulting member Zeller, Groups characterised before their inception by strong friendship bonds seem more compassionate towards defaulting members.
With regard to the risk pooling, the presumed positive effects of homogeneity are offset by the negative effect of covariant risk. Repayment problems are 3 In order to incorporate traditional, easily measurable socio-economic explanatory variables with more untraditional latent variables like the domino effect and homogeneity, Paxton et al.
Measurement of SHGs performance Worldwide micro-credit groups are mainly formed in order to obtain outside credit. Although this could harness and strengthen the group cohesion, failure or disputes arising from the distribution of profits from these activities can 19 This is defined as the number of days in between the day they were informed about the SHGconcept or contacted by a fieldworker and the day they made their first savings contribution.
Description of potential determinants of performance Next, we turn to the potential determinants of performance. Again the sign The coefficient of the interaction term of the SGSY-dummy, representing the dynamic incentive of a promised stream of increasingly larger loans, and the basic infrastructure index shows the effect of this dynamic incentive in remote villages.
Self-selection has only a limited effect on financial performance. It is positively associated with group savings, but it raises the probability of arrears. It has a statistically significant negative impact on group savings, which could be the result of the reliance on intra-group solidarity. The dynamic incentive of promised access to increasingly larger outside credit also is a decisive determinant of group performance. They raise the probability of intra-group loan arrears and the arrears on outside credit and they are negatively associated with overall performance.
Compared to the other group characteristics, peer monitoring, proxied by the frequency of meetings, and peer pressure play only a limited role in explaining group performance. Self-selection and peer monitoring play only a limited role, with monitoring exerting positive effects only. The dynamic incentive of promised, increasingly larger outside credit and remoteness remain crucial and their results are still parallel but with opposite signs. The number of SHGs in a village appears to have a strong effect on group performance.
It is Peer pressure also not detrimental to intra-group credit repayment anymore. Social ties are less important in determining a groups performance and have an ambiguous, but predominantly negative effect.
Although group solidarity may affect group performance in a positive way, it does not seem to play a crucial role in explaining group performance. The existence of other SHGs in the village appears to inflict predominantly negative externalities upon the groups performance.
The vast majority attributed the success of microfinance to its innovative group-lending and joint-liability component. Joint-liability was heralded as the driving force behind self-selection alleviating the adverse selection problem, the use of inside information through harnessing social ties and peer monitoring deterring moral hazard, and the imposition and use of social sanctions and group solidarity circumventing the enforcement problem.
Recently, some economic theorists point to the importance of other innovations like dynamic incentives. First, given the huge amount of resources being pledged to support for microfinance and the scarce empirical evidence of the determinants of microfinance performance, the need for empirical testing of the theoretical propositions has been felt by many authors.
Due to data problems the impact of this dynamic incentive could not investigated by other studies. Although we initially found evidence of predominantly positive externalities of the existence of other Self Help Groups in the same village, controlling for endogeneity suggests a negative impact.
Group solidarity, which at first seemed to be the crucial determinant of a groups success, does not appear to be important either. Documents Similar To Theories. Deepak Singh. Amanda Wolfe. Bahati Richardson. Ricky Arroyo. Audithya Kahawatta. Simar Madhok. Estrelita B. SH Raihan. Madan Shrestha. Alex David. Puneet Singh Dhani. Edris Yawar. Manvi Pareek. The leaders were able to communicate with local banks and microfinance institutions in order to demand investments for their businesses.
The women involved are now able to read and write, and successfully manage their businesses, along with an increased level of social status within the family and local community. Following the loans, women were able to buy necessary goods such as bicycles, certain types of food they were not able to buy before, kitchen utensils, livestock, TV, radio and so on.
These women are now financially independent, and can easily access their bank accounts to manage their small-scale activities. Along with the financial growth these women Massachussets Institute of Technology. The Washington Post. Conclusion With the insertion of investment, women were seen to able to increase their productivity, thereby increasing income and consequently increasing savings.
The women of Project Koppal opened safe bank accounts to secure capital and initiated profitable businesses, which systematically helped them reach out situations of poverty. Furthermore, the women of project Koppal showed that through the years, as Pangea Onlus stopped lending money, they were able to continue with their small-scale businesses in education, livestock, agriculture and many other sectors.
The women were able to demand local banks and microcredit institutions for further loans to continue growing as businesses. Arising from this study are various unresolved questions linked to the criticism of microcredit.
Roodman argues that data from microcredit organizations such as Pangea Onlus is often unreliable, and most probably it is difficult to determine the level of success of these microcredit institutions. Abu N. Addiction to Microcredit:an obstacle to social and financial mobility, University of Cape Coast, Department of Economics.
Koomson and Peprah 3. Fondazione Pangea Onlus. Quando le donne fanno impresa e diventano una banca. How is poverty measured?. March 10, 8. News Service, June 27 9. The Microfinance Promise.
Open navigation menu. Close suggestions Search Search. User Settings. Skip carousel. Carousel Previous. Carousel Next. What is Scribd? Explore Ebooks. Bestsellers Editors' Picks All Ebooks. Explore Audiobooks. Bestsellers Editors' Picks All audiobooks.
Explore Magazines. Editors' Picks All magazines. Explore Podcasts All podcasts. Difficulty Beginner Intermediate Advanced. Explore Documents. Uploaded by taylorbrennan. Document Information click to expand document information Description: The scope of this essay is to analyze the theory of microfinance, by studying the ideologies of Muhammad Yunus, founder of such economical phenomenon, and assessing the attempts of Pangea Onlus to the extent of helping its clients reach out of the poverty trap.
Did you find this document useful? Is this content inappropriate? Report this Document. Description: The scope of this essay is to analyze the theory of microfinance, by studying the ideologies of Muhammad Yunus, founder of such economical phenomenon, and assessing the attempts of Pangea Onlus to the extent of helping its clients reach out of the poverty trap.
Flag for inappropriate content. Download now. Theory of Microfinance. Related titles. Carousel Previous Carousel Next. Jump to Page. Search inside document. The five main objectives of the Grameen Bank project are: eliminate exploitation of the poor which occurred during informal savings systems, extend banking institutions to the poor, promote jobs for unemployed Bangladeshis, enroll women in more important job and leadership roles and most importantly reverse the cycle of low income, low savings, low capital 5 Muhammad Yunus.
Although group-microlending may seem as a successful anti-poverty policy, researchers from the Green Bank of Caraga performed tests to evaluate the effectiveness of such mechanism 8 Critique of Microcredit as a Development Model, Grace Levin.
According to David Roodman, microcredit rarely transforms lives, after a loan some do better than others Individuals who do not qualify for do have access to loans rely on informal savings systems which demand a lot of interests, that most often cannot be paid back and have very 17 Microcredit doesnt end poverty, despite all the hype The Washington Post.
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